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This thesis is an attempt to access how good has been the South Korean economic 
performance since the end of the Korean War and how interventionist the government 
has been, and to decide what has been responsible for the economic growth, the 
government or the free market. The main indicators of the Korean performance and the 
roles of the government and of the free market on the economy are discussed. A 
regression is run relating the GDP growth rate to the degree of trade liberalization and 
government spending. 
The findings can be summarized as follows: 1) The Korean performance has been 
outstanding. 2) The government and free market's roles and their contributions to the 
economic growth have varied in different periods in the Korean economy. First was the 
period from the end of the Korean War until the military coup of 1961, with government 
highly interventionist, the free market repressed, and poor results. Second was the period 
from 1961 until 1980, characterized by an interplay between the government and the free 
market leading to a high economic growth. Third was the period from 1980 to the 
present, the liberalization period, with market forces being the main source of the high 
economic growth. 3) The economy has been negatively affected by government spending 
and trade restrictions. 
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South Korea is a small, densely populated country of about 99,000 square 
kilometers. In 1994, its population was 44.45 million (IMF, 1995, p. 483). It has limited 
natural resources. Its mountainous terrain does not favor agriculture. From the end of the 
Korean war until the military coup of 1961 (1954-61), Korean growth of GDP averaged 
4.1%. From 1962 until 1993, however, this growth averaged the impressive level of 
8.54%. As a result of this performance, it now has much in common with the 
industrialized countries of the world. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
Korean economic performance has been the subject of great interest and 
controversy among economists, especially those who advise developing countries. While 
these countries have been facing so many difficulties, with low growth rates, and many of 
them witnessing the fall of their already low standards of living, the Korean economy has 
been growing persistently. Leading economists of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank are supporters of the free market theory of rapid growth. Therefore, their 
prescription for development is liberalization and privatization (Wade 1990, p. 5). In 
opposition to them are those economists who defend government intervention. Each side 
explains the South Korean growth from a different perspective. For economists who 
believe in free market as a way to achieve sustained growth, this success came as a result 
of market forces working over a suitable environment provided by the state. For those 
who support the idea of government intervention, this achievement is due to the correct 
interventionist policies adopted by the South Korean government. There are even 
economists who even argue that the Korean performance has not been that good. 
Many questions come into play at this point. Why did South Korean economy do 
so well after the Korean War? How good was the Korean performance? Did the South 
Korean government intervene heavily in the economy? Did South Korea's economic 
growth vary directly with the degree of government intervention or did South Korea's 
economy do well in spite of the government intervention? This study is an attempt to 
decide which side of the controversy is right or close to being right. If the Korean case is 
found to be supportive of the current free market prescription, the guidelines for 
developing countries can be maintained. But if the argument that the government 
steerage of the economy has been the prevailing factor in this country, then the guidelines 
need to be reassessed (Wade 1990, p. 5). 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This study focuses on the main aspects of the Korean development. The main 
facts about South Korea's economic performance are presented and discussed. The roles 
played by the government and private sector and their effects on the economic growth are 
analyzed. 
Distances between The United States and The Republic of South Korea prevented 
hands-on examination of pertinent documentation to this thesis research. Time, or lack 
thereof, was also a factor which limited research to items within easy reach. Data about 
government policies and official results was therefore gleaned from data already reported 
in studies by other authors. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The remainder of this thesis is composed of six chapters. Chapter II presents the 
concepts of free market and interventionism focusing on the sense in which these words 
are used throughout this study. Chapter III presents the key facts about South Korea's 
economic performance over the last three decades. Chapter IV shows the context and 
main theories that explain the Korean economic growth: the free market theory, the 
simulated free market theory, and governed market theory. Chapter V discuss the main 
policies adopted by the government, the response of the private market, and the relation 
of these roles to the relevant results in terms of economic growth. Chapter VI analyzes 
and offers an interpretation about the contribution of the government and the private 
market to the economic growth. Chapter VII summarizes the findings of this research. 

H. DEFINING FREE MARKET AND INTERVENTIONISM 
Before entering the main discussion of this study, I will offer my understanding of 
the concepts of Free Market and Government Intervention. This is so that the exact sense 
in which these concepts are used throughout this text is clear. It is necessary because this 
thesis is an attempt to decide what is responsible for the outstanding economic growth 
achieved by South Korea, the government's interventionist policies or market forces. 
These concepts will be central in the argument and should be well delineated in order to 
avoid miscommunication. 
It should be noted, however, that this is not an attempt to define or confront and 
judge the merit of each different theory of economic thought. Clarification of these terms 
is vital in a thorough discussion of these issues. 
A. FREE MARKET 
The free market is an environment where the individuals have the freedom to 
decide what to do with their resources. In his article "Capitalism" in The Fortune 
Encyclopedia of Economics, Robert Hessen, a business historian, writes: 
Subject to certain restrictions, individuals (alone or with others) 
are free to decide where to invest, what to produce or sell, and what prices 
to charge, and there is no natural limit to the range of their efforts in terms 
of assets, sales and profits, or the number of customers, employees, and 
investors, or whether they operate in local, regional, national, or 
international markets. (Hessen, 1993) 
Because of its use as a direct opposition to socialism, the word capitalism carries an 
ideological content and a broad meaning. I prefer the idea of a free market that is more 
easily related to economics, and is fitting to the context of this research. Nevertheless, 
this statement translates the message of free market that I will focus on in this analysis. 
It is interesting to note in the above example that Professor Hessen mentions 
certain restrictions in this freedom to decide. He does not explain what these restrictions 
are. I feel that Hessen means that they are not restrictions imposed by the government but 
some limitations imposed by the market itself. Since all individuals have the same 
freedom, some boundaries must exist between the independence of each one. Before 
deciding what to do with his resources, each person must take into consideration whether 
that decision will impinge on the freedom of other individuals in the society. Any 
limitation thus imposed on the citizen by the government demands some sort of 
intervention. 
B. INTERVENTIONISM 
Interventionism is an environment where the government, not individuals, 
controls the use of resources. This is the opposite of a free market economy. It does not 
mean that the government has to directly apply the resources on its own, but that it exerts 
a definite influence and power in the allocation of the resources. This authority is 
exercised through a set of measures that force individuals to use their resources the way 
the government dictates that they be used. These measures refer to control over price, 
exchange rates, interest rates and wages. They also encompass the imposition of import 
barriers (namely quotas and tariffs) and export tariffs, taxation, concession of subsidies, 
and credit allocation. 
Let me make clear also how the word "intervention" is used in this text. Simply 
stated, intervention, in my opinion, is not just government action. It is a measure adopted 
by the government that limits the individuals' freedom to make choices. It should not be 
confused with just a government act. The government can act by removing an 
intervention that was previously imposed. This is moving away from interventionism to a 
free market economy. 
In his working paper, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan 
Grew Rich", Dani Rodrik (1994) effectively illustrates my ideas. He states that: 
...the Korean and Taiwanese governments managed to engineer a 
significant increase in the private return to capital. They did so not only by 
removing a number of impediments to investment and establishing a 
sound investment climate, but more importantly by alleviating a 
coordination failure which had blocked economic take-off. The latter 
required a range of strategic interventions.... 
While the latter, the coordination failure, may have required interventionist measures, the 
removal of the impediments to investment and the establishment of a sound investment 
climate required measures that are not interventions. On the contrary, it means that the 
government ultimately reduced interventions in the economy. 
As a final comment to what was previously stated, one last point should be made. 
It is that neither a fully market-free economy nor an absolutely interventionist 
government currently exist. In the words of Professor Hessen (1993): "A fully free 
economy (laissez-faire) never has existed...." Some degree of freedom always exists for 
individuals to decide how their resources should be utilized. Some degree of government 
intervention is present at the same time. The market has some degree of freedom in how 
it is run. In fact, the economies are perceived to the extent in which their governments 
intervene on them, thus causing them to be labeled more or less interventionist. One 
thing for sure is that the way the market is run has influence on its economic 
performance. 

HI. KOREAN PERFORMANCE 
In this chapter, some of the key facts about South Korea's economic performance 
over the last three decades will be presented. This performance has caused South Korea 
to be widely considered a role model of economic growth to many developing countries. 
There are reasons for this popularity. In 1950, its per capita income was about $553 (in 
1990 dollars)1 and the life expectancy of its citizens was about 50 years (World Bank, 
1989, p. 2). Forty years later, its per capita income was about $ 5,917 (in 1990 dollars) 
(IMF, 1994, p. 463), and the average life expectancy was 71 years (World Bank, 1992, p. 
219). Now, South Korea's economy has more in common with the industrial economies 
than with the poorest economies in South Asia. 
Although this data is impressive, there is no unanimity among economists about 
how excellent this performance is and to what extent it serves as a model. It depends on 
what each economist perceives as being the major sources of this growth and how 
adequate they are in promoting a sustained future growth. Paul Krugman (1994) provides 
some ideas about this controversy when he states that "the rapid Asian growth is less of a 
model for the West than many writers claim, and the future prospects for that growth are 
more limited than almost anyone now imagines." In one aspect, however, all economists 
agree: growth has been exceptional. The numbers indicate this change. Interpretation of 
its excellence and what future perspectives might be is open for critical discussion. 
A. GDP GROWTH 
Figure 3.1 is the chief exhibit to show South Korea's outstanding achievement: the 
growth in GDP and GDP per capita. Although the economic growth has fluctuated year 
after year, its broad tendency is evident. First was an initial period when the GDP grew at 
low rates. This period lasted from the 1950s until 1962. Following this period, GDP 
growth was sustained around a high mean until the late 1980s. In more recent years, a 
slight decreasing trend started. In a broad sense, this exhibit shows that the economic 
growth is fluctuating around a high mean. 
1
 The dollar value cited in the reference was $350 (in 1980 dollars). It was converted to the 1990 basis using 
the GDP deflator table from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1994. 
The South Korean economy shows signs of being negatively affected in two 
periods in the 1970s, from 1970 to 1972, and from 1977 to 1980. In these periods a 
decreasing tendency in the growth rates can be seen. The first oil shock seems to be 
linked with the first period. The second period was particularly significant. A negative 
growth occurred in 1980. It was the first time since 1956 that the economy experienced 
this type of result. The effect of the second oil shock, the turbulent political climate that 
followed President Park's assassination in 1979, and the poor rice harvest of 1980 seem 
to be linked with this marked decrease in growth. A quick recovery from both these 
events is evident, however. 
What guarantees its status of being "remarkable" is not just the fact that South 
Korea's economy has been growing at a high mean, but the difference it makes when 
compared with other countries. Its GDP growth averaged 8.84% from 1964 to 1992. 
Concurrently, the developing countries' GDP grew at an average of 4.66% and the 
industrialized countries grew at 3.26% (IMF, 1994). In fact, none of today's wealthy 
countries had such a rapid transformation in their respective economies. They became 
prosperous through gradual, methodical growth. 
Figure 3.1. Growth in GDP and GDP per Capita 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook ,1984 and 1994. 
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The GDP per capita growth reveals another significant fact about South Korea's 
performance. It increased at almost the same rate as the GDP did. This sharp rise 
occurred because the economy has been growing faster than the population. In fact, the 
population growth rate decreased from about 3% in the 1950s to less than 1% in the late 
1980s2. This is a curious fact in the examination of a developing country. The population 
growth rate in this category of nations does not show this decreasing tendency. This fact, 
however, is not of capital significance, nor is it even an issue worthy of pursuit. What 
matters is that the economy is able to grow faster than the population. 
B. INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
South Korea's status as an export country has been pointed out by some 
economists as the primary reason for its economic success. This export-led hypothesis 
explains how newly-industrialized Asian countries have grown as a result of an outward- 
trade orientation adopted by their governments. The increase in the export-GDP ratio is 
an important argument for this supposition. A statement from Ian Little (1994), 
exemplifies this opinion: 
...the outstanding success of Korea and Taiwan from the early 1960s to the 
mid-1970s was based on a phenomenal growth of labor-intensive 
manufactures. This branch of manufacturing took off because exports 
were highly profitable once the bias against manufacturing for export was 
removed. 
The World Bank's recent study (1989, p. 6) emphasizes this point. Its conclusion states 
that "the dragons' success as exporters gave them abundant foreign exchange with which 
to buy investment goods from abroad, so a virtuous circle of exceptionally rapid growth 
began." 
Figure 3.2 presents information that is surprising to a certain extent. The export- 
GDP ratio has risen from virtually 0% in the late 1950s to almost 35% in the late 1980s. 
It rose particularly rapidly from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s. This was the period 
when the Korean economy took off. The ratio's increase slowed down somewhat after 
that period but persisted until the mid-1980s, when it began a marked decrease. 
2
 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1984 and 1994. 
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When observed by itself, the export-GDP ratio is impressive and consistent with 
the export-led hypothesis. The surprise occurs when it is juxtaposed with the import- 
GDP ratio of the same graph. It would be reasonable to expect a persistent surplus in 
external trade from a country whose strength is based upon exportation of goods. Yet, 
South Korea has been maintaining a considerable deficit. A trade surplus was achieved 
only for a short period of time between 1986 to 1989. 
Year 
Figure 3.2. Exports, Imports, and Surplus as a percent of the GDP 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1984 and 1994) 
While it is valid that exports provided the South Korean economy foreign 
exchange with which to buy investment goods, one vital question still remains. Was the 
export sector substantial enough to account for the GDP growth? Figure 3.2 presents data 
which helps to answer this question. During the time period when this exceptional 
growth started, exports were not very significant when compared with the GDP. It was 
not until the 1970s that the export-GDP ratio was enough to affect decisively country's 
economic growth. It suggests that, at least in the early period of the Korean take-off, 
another source has to be credited for the performance. 
Dani Rodrik (1994, p. 2) argues that the export-led growth story "is incomplete 
and quite misleading in the importance it attaches to the role of export-orientation in the 
growth performance." He continues by stating that "a much more plausible explanation 
12 
for the economic take-off is the sharp increase in investment demand that took place in 
the early 1960s." It seems, however, that Rodrik's explanation faces the same problem as 
the export-led argument faces. The investment-GDP ratio, which is the basic argument he 
presents to defend his idea, was not a significant factor in the early 1960s as well. It is 
true that investment as a percent of the GDP grew rapidly after 1959, as we can see in 
Figure 3.3. However, it was only in 1967 that it reached and exceeded the level normally 
achieved by industrialized countries. 
Michell (1988) argues that both exports and the domestic sector contributed to the 
initial growth. Although exports were not the initial determining factor, a set of policies 
to encourage exports adopted in 1959 and removal of previous extreme constraints on 
trade with Japan after the overthrown of Syngman Rhee in April 1960 caused growth in 
this sector. Most of the initial growth came from domestic sources. In his opinion, the 
biggest factor causing domestic growth was not so much new investment as the rational 
use of underutilized existing resources. Following this reasoning he quotes the Korean 
Economic Planning Board, which in 1965 recognized that "the high growth rate 
registered, with a relatively small investment ratio, was attributable to the remarkable 
expansion of agricultural production..., and also to the fact that hitherto idle capacity and 
surplus labour were more effectively utilized".(p. 11) 
Table 3.1 presents the contribution of exports and domestic sectors to the growth 
in GNP. Based on this data, Michell states that "exports alone cannot explain the 
transition from low to high growth in the 1960s and due weight must be attributed to the 
domestic market; whereas during the 1970s the degree to which exports were vital to the 
economy of the Republic of Korea can hardly be exaggerated." 
When referring back to Figure 3.2, another issue is raised by the decreasing 
tendency in both the export-GDP and import-GDP ratios as shown from the late 1980s 
on. This trend clearly suggests that the South Korean economy has been faced with 
problems in the international trade market. This issue was addressed by Mark Clifford 
(1994) in his book "Troubled Tiger". He offers these insights: 
South Korea's economic growth had already been extraordinary. 
But from 1986 to 1988 it underwent a boom of unprecedented 
magnitude...It was during these three years that business people and 
13 
politicians in Tokyo, Washington and Brussels began fretting that Korea 
would become "another Japan," running chronic trade and current account 
surpluses as a result of policies designed to encourage exports and 
discourage imports. Trade disputes, especially with the United States and 
Europe, escalated sharply. 
Table 3.1. Contribution of Export Growth and Domestic Growth to GNP 
Growth, 1961-83. 
Year < jTowth due to GNP Growth 
Export Domestic Market 
% % 
1961 1.0 (18) 4.6 (82) 5.6 
1962 1.1 (50) 1.1 (50) 2.2 
1963 1.5 (16) 7.6 (84) 9.1 
1964 1.1 (11) 8.5 (89) 9.6 
1965 1.9 (33) 3.9 (67) 5.8 
1966 1.6 (13) 11.1 (87) 12.7 
1967 1.8 (27) 4.8 (73) 6.6 
1968 3.0 (27) 8.3 (73) 11.3 
1969 3.3 (24) 10.5 (76) 13.8 
1970 2.5 (33) 5.1 (67) 7.6 
1971 2.7 (29) 6.7 (71) 9.4 
1972 6.2 (107) -0.4 (-7) 5.8 
1973 10.4 (70) 4.5 (30) 14.9 
1974 1.6 (20) 6.4 (80) 8.0 
1975 3.3 (46) 3.8 (54) 7.1 
1976 8.6 (57) 6.5 (43) 15.1 
1977 4.2 (41) 6.1 (59) 10.3 
1978 3.6 (31) 8.0 (69) 11.6 
1979 0.1 (2) 6.4 (98) 6.5 
1980 3.9 ( ) -9.1 ( ) -5.2 
1981 2.1 (34) 4.1 (66) 6.2 
1982 4.1 (74) 1.4 (26) 5.5 
1983 6.0 (65) 3.3 (35) 9.3 
From Michell (1988, p. 30). 
These kind of problems can be expected as one economy enlarges and becomes able to 
influence the international economy. By the late 1980s, South Korea had become a very 
important exporter in the world scenario. The reaction from other economies, whose 
producers' interests were threatened by their notable success, was to be expected. 
14 
C. INVESTMENT 
An economic expansion is produced by two sources of growth: increase in inputs 
and increase in output per unit of input. The first is related to labor force and stock of 
physical capital, while the latter is related to efficiency in the use of these resources. 
Figure 3.3 captures important points related to this issue in regarding to South Korea's 
growth. The investment-GDP ratio in South Korea rose from around 10% in the 1950s to 
35% in the 1980s. This is by far a superior increase to that achieved by other developing 
countries. The contrast is even greater and more meaningful when compared with 
industrialized countries. These nations have consistently maintained their ratio in the 
range of between 20% and 25%, with a decreasing trend since the mid-1970s. 






















, jf .*c 





_  * 
"*,»• 
_--^ 
'■* . •* 
- I I I I I I I I I I I I I !■ I I I I I I I I I I I J I I I I I I I I I i I 
in       m eo       »- 
"    s 
N. o w <o O) CM in 00 vr- 
<o t^ f- f«. !>- oo 00 00 0) O) o> o> O) Ol O) o> a> O) 
Year 
Figure 3.3. Investment as a Percent of the GDP 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1986 and 1994. 
These figures suggest that the increase in input largely explains South Korean's 
growth. On the other hand, the industrialized countries' source of expansion is based on 
their continuous improvement of the way they use their resources. In fact, it is a powerful 
argument for economists who see growth in the Asian countries as being a consequence 
of capital accumulation. The following statement from Paul Krugman (1994) addresses 
this issue: 
15 
The newly industrializing countries of Asia, like the Soviet Union 
of the 1950s, have achieved rapid growth in large part through an 
astonishing mobilization of resources. ...Asian growth, like that of the 
Soviet Union in its high-growth era, seems to be driven by extraordinary 
growth in inputs like labor and capital rather than by gains in efficiency. 
Using the Summers & Heston and OECD data sets, Professor Alwyn Young 
(1993) explains that "once factor accumulation is taken into account, productivity growth 
in the economies of the NICs, and in particular in their tradable manufacturing sectors, 
does not appear to be extraordinary high." He continues, writing that the NICs' output 
growth are "not substantially greater than what one would have predicted, given the 
doubling, tripling and quadrupling of the investment to GDP ratios in these economies." 
More dramatic are the findings of Professor Laurence Lau and his associate Jong- 
II Kim (1994). They analyzed the sources of economic growth of the East Asian NICs 
using the aggregate "meta-production function" framework, and came to this conclusion: 
...the hypothesis that there has been no technical progress during 
the postwar period cannot be rejected for the four East Asian newly 
industrialized countries. By far the most important source of economic 
growth of the East Asian newly industrialized countries is capital 
accumulation, accounting for between 48 and 72% of their economic 
growth, in contrast to the case of the Group-of-Five industrialized 
countries, in which technical progress has played the most important role, 
accounting for between 46% to 71% of their economic growth. 
Is input-driven growth harmful? No, but it is limited because a worker's capacity 
to handle inputs is limited. It is impossible for a country to maintain high growth rates for 
a long period of time without a rise in output per unit of input. This suggests that the 
outstanding growth achieved by South Korea cannot be sustained indefinitely unless 
resources are used more and more efficiently. In fact, this argument is consistent with the 
decreasing trend in GDP and GDP per capita shown in Figure 3.1. These rates have been 
decreasing since the mid-1980s and indicate that economic growth in South Korea is 
now slower. 
16 
D. FINANCING THE GROWTH 
South Korea's investment as a percent of GDP grew persistently until 1979. Since 
then, it has fluctuated between 30% and 35%. A question concerning this situation arises: 
What is the significant source of this investment and for how long will it be available to 
sustain its high level? 
Economic activity can be financed by two main sources: the nation's savings and 
foreign capital. The latter flows to the economy voluntarily through international 
investors, as international assistance or borrowed resources. A comfortable situation for 
an economy is one in which its investment is financed by its own savings. This is not the 
case for South Korea. All the sources cited above had their individual role in supporting 
the economy. 
Figure 3.4 relates the level of investment to savings. It can be seen that the heavy 
investments required to sustain South Korea's rapid economic growth have almost 
always been beyond this country's savings capabilities. For only a short time in the late 
1980s, this condition did not occur. It does not mean that savings have been low in this 
country; rather it reflects an impressive level of investment. In fact, the upward trend in 
the savings-ODP ratio and the 35% level achieved in the late 1980s are an outstanding 
mark. This is superior to the level of savings achieved by industrialized countries (about 
24% in the 1970s and 20% in the 1980s)3. 
Since these savings were not able to support South Korean growth, external flow 
of capital played an important role in the economy. According to Parvez Hasan (1976) 
"in the early sixties the investment rate of about 12.5% of GDP was financed mainly by 
resources inflow from abroad, principally in the form of U.S. aid." This monetary 
assistance, however, was not considerable and it ended in the mid-1970s. This gap was 
filled by international investors and by borrowing foreign funds. 
Borrowing foreign funds has been the major source of capital to fill the 
investment-savings gap. The external debt grew from a negligible amount in the early 
1960s to more than U$ 47 billion in 19934. Figure 3.5 clarifies the vital role that external 
3
 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1994 
4
 Source: Parvez Hasan [Ref. 10], table SA25 and World Bank: World Debt Tables. 
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debt plays in the South Korean economy. The debt-GDP ratio grew dramatically until 
1985 when it reached a level of 50%. From that year on it fell dramatically. In 1989, 
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Figure 3.5. External Debt as a Percent of the GDP 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables 1987 vol. 2, 1988 vol. 3, and 1994 vol 2. 
Parvez Hasan (1976), table SA25. 
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It is interesting to note the South Korean performance in the late 1980s. There 
was a surplus in trade, savings exceeded investment, and the debt-GDP ratio fell. Mark 
Clifford (1994) labels this period "The Big Boom" and "The Second Take-Off." What 
followed the "Big Boom" period cannot be considered a bad performance. The savings 
and the investment are almost at the same level. This suggests that the growth can be 
financed internally. The low 14% external debt-GDP ratio means that, if necessary, 
South Korea can borrow from abroad to finance further domestic economic growth. 
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IV. EXPLAINING KOREAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The explanations for the Korean economic growth are presented in the context of 
the East Asian newly industrialized countries, NICs. The outstanding achievement of 
these countries has been claimed as supporting evidence by both sides of opposing 
theories. On one side are those economists who attribute this success to the substantial 
role played by the state in directing the economy. On the other side are those who 
interpret this performance as due primarily to the actions and efforts of private 
individuals in a free market. This chapter presents the context and basic ideas that 
support each point of view and how they are applied to explain the NICs performance, 
especially in the case of South Korea. 
A. THE CONTEXT AND THEORY 
The dirigisme^ experienced by the industrialized countries during the Great 
Depression and wartime provided the basis for the predominant approach to economic 
policy in the 1950s and 1960s. This approach assigned a significant role in the economy 
to the state. Economists who supported this approach believed that only the government 
has the capacity to deal with distortions in the market caused by circumstances called 
"market failures". According to this view, the market is not able to repair itself when 
problems occur. These ideas were also taken up by economists dealing with 
underdeveloped countries. Besides market failures, the special circumstances of these 
countries, such as low private savings, dependence on primary products exports, small 
internal markets, limited skills, and few entrepreneurs adept at large-scale organization, 
were claimed by these economists as justification for an even bigger role for the state 
than in the more developed countries. In this view, the reliance on a free market would 
perpetuate the coexistence of precapitalist with capitalist forms of production, 
condemning them to remain underdeveloped. The government should not only supply 
public goods but also undertake direct responsibility for establishing a mechanism that 
1
 Dirigisme in the French sense contains the idea of directional thrust, or orienting power, in the hands of 
government (Petit Larousse 1975). 
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would guarantee the allocation of resources into productive investments. The substance 
of this point of view is that the engine of development is capital formation. (Wade, 1990, 
p. 8) 
Notice that this view of market failure differs from the usual market failure idea 
that economists use to justify government intervention in the economy. According to 
Gwartney and Stroup, (1992, p. 523), the causes of market failure can be grouped into 
four general classes: externalities, public goods, poorly informed buyers or sellers, and 
monopoly. 
Cowen (1993, p. 75) states that "externalities occur when one person's actions 
affect another person's well-being and the relevant costs and benefits are not reflected in 
market price." Gwartney and Stroup (1992, p. 543), point out how externalities can 
distort the economy: 
When externalities are present, the market may fail to confront 
decision-makers with the proper incentives. Since decision-makers are 
not forced to consider external costs, they may find it personally 
advantageous to undertake an economic activity even though it generates a 
net loss to the community. In contrast, when external benefits are present, 
decision-makers may fail to undertake economic action that would 
generate a net social gain. 
In the original formulation by Paul Samuelson, there are two distinctive 
characteristics of public goods. First, the availability of a public good to one person 
makes it equally available to all others. Second, because of this joint consumption, it may 
be impossible to exclude nonpayers from the receipt of a public good. (Gwartney and 
Stroup, 1992, p. 537) As a consequence of its characteristics, the public good may cause 
a distortion in the market: 
When it is costly or impossible to withhold a public good from 
persons who do not or will not help pay for it, the market system breaks 
down because everyone has an incentive to become a free rider. When 
everyone attempts to ride for free, production of the public good will be 
lower than the socially ideal level. (Gwartney and Stroup, 1992, p. 544) 
Poor information poses another challenge to the market, thereby causing the 
market mechanism to weaken. 
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Consumers do not have perfect knowledge about the quality of a 
product, the price of alternative products, or side effects that may result 
from a product. They may make incorrect decisions, decisions they will 
later regret...When this is the case, business entrepreneurs have a strong 
incentive to cut costs by reducing quality. (Gwartney and Stroup, 1992, p. 
539) 
The argument that a monopoly causes distortions in the market is cited by Stigler 
(1993, p. 400): 
...the purely "economic" case against monopoly is that it reduces 
aggregate economic welfare (as opposed to simply making some people 
worse off and others better off by an equal amount). When the monopolist 
raises prices above the competitive level in order to reap his monopoly 
profits, customers buy less of the product, less is produced, and society as 
a whole is worse off. In short, monopoly reduces society's income. 
According to Wade (1992, p. 9), "the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a 
downgrading of the role of the state in both developed and less developed countries". In 
the context of the less developed countries (LDCs), he lists three examples of evidence 
presented by economists at that time: 
1. the use of the state to promote import-substituting industrialization 
during the 1950s and the 1960s had resulted in inefficient industries 
requiring permanent subsidization, with little prospect of achieving 
international competitiveness. 
2. extensive government intervention tended to generate "rent-seeking" 
on a significant scale, that is, to divert the energies of economic agents 
away from production and into lobbying for increased allocations of 
government subsidies and protection. 
3. some of the most successful LDCs, including Taiwan, South Korea, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore, had achieved extraordinary industrial growth 
by using an outward-oriented model driven by market incentives and a 
strong private sector. 
Even the previously accepted idea of government intervention in the case of market 
failure began to be challenged. The idea of "government failure" as being as pervasive as 
market failure, if not more so, began to gain importance. Some economists believed that 
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such failure, indeed, was an inherent tendency of all governments. Shaw (1993, p. 150) 
defines this concept: 
In the past many economists have argued that the way to rein in 
"market failures" such as monopolies is to introduce government action. 
But public choice economists point out that there also is such a thing as 
"government failure." That is, there are reasons why government 
intervention does not achieve the desired effect. 
The idea of government failure is the same as market failure. Although individuals acting 
in the political marketplace have some concern for others, their motive, in fact, is self- 
interest. This can cause distortions in the market the same way as individuals do. 
These circumstances caused the current theories about development policies to 
shift from the prescriptions of the 1950s and 1960s toward a "neoclassical" view of the 
appropriate role of the government. According to this view, the government's role is to 
provide institutional arrangements that enable the market to operate. Once these 
arrangements are in place the market can take care of itself and allocate resources 
efficiently. This efficient allocation of resources, not capital formation, is the engine of 
development. What drives the economy to its maximum production potential is the profit 
incentives, with prices reflecting the scarcity of resources. Hence, government should 
allow private producers to operate through market mechanisms. It should function only 
as the supplier of those goods and services where it has clear comparative advantage, 
namely public goods and services. Wade (1990, p. 11) explains the key development 
policy according to the neoclassical approach: 
The key development policy is therefore an outward-oriented trade 
regime, characterized by low or negligible impediments to imports, 
relatively uniform incentives for different production activities, and 
incentives for export sale equal to the incentives for domestic market sale. 
These conditions will maximize the economy's income and growth (in 
world prices) by concentrating resources on those activities in which the 
economy has a comparative advantage, leading other forms of production 
to other nations. In addition, by expanding the proportion of the economy 
which is directly subject to international competitive pressures, the 
government's own ability to impose "political" prices is weakened; hence 
producers' uncertainty about government policy is reduced. 
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This approach is supported by two main concepts: profit incentives and 
comparative advantage. The idea that profit incentives lead individuals to allocate their 
resources on activities that also promote the economic well-being of the society is 
expressed in the Invisible Hand Principle by Adam Smith (1976, p. 477): 
...every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue 
of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to 
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By 
preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends 
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as 
its product may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and 
he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an 
end which was not part of his intention. Nor is always the worse for the 
society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently 
promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends 
to promote it. 
The comparative advantage concept explains why mutual gains arise from trade 
and specialization. A nation or individual has comparative advantage in the production of 
a good when its production costs are low compared to the production costs of other 
goods. According to this law, trading partners are better off if they specialize in the 
production of goods for which they are a low opportunity cost producer and trade for 
those goods for which they are a high opportunity cost producer. Specialization in the 
area of one's comparative advantage minimizes the cost of production and leads to 
maximum joint output. (Gwartney and Stroup, 1992, p. 416) 
B. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EAST ASIAN SUCCESS 
The two approaches stated above form the foundation for three main explanations 
of the East Asians NICs performance: The Free Market theory, the Simulated Free 
Market theory and the Governed Market theory. The first two rely on the neoclassical 
point of view, while the third depends on interventionist ideas. 
1. Free Market (FM) Theory 
The views of those who claim that the NICs' success is due to a free market are 
summarized by Wade (1990, p. 4): 
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There are those who hold that East Asian economic success is to 
be ascribed to economic openness and small government. With internal 
prices reflecting real scarcities and the state kept firmly in its place, 
resources flowed to their most efficient uses. The limitations of small 
domestic markets were overcome by exporting manufactured goods at 
competitive prices. In contrast, countries which adopted more inward- 
looking strategies based on the domestic market have stagnated, partly 
because of small market size and partly because the regulations needed to 
support the strategy choked the initiative of private businesspeople, 
depriving them of the stimulus of competition and misdirecting their 
remaining energies into lobbying and other socially unproductive 
activities. 
There is abundant literature attributing the success of the five NICs to their 
reliance on free market. Edward Chen (1979, p. 41) asserts that "state intervention is 
largely absent. What the state provided is simply a suitable environment for the 
entrepreneurs to perform their functions." According to this author, the NICs' 
performance demonstrates that "the free market environment provides the necessary 
mechanism to gear the economies towards their optimal points on the production 
possibilities frontier"(1979, p. 185). A slightly different argument is presented by John 
Fei (1983, p. 34). He states that "the basic causation of success of the East Asian NICs 
on the policy front, can be traced to the lessening of government interference in the 
market economy during the E-0 [Export-Oriented] phase." He continues, "in Taiwan 
and Korea, interference with the market was considerably less as compared to other 
worse offenders in the near NICs and the Latin American countries..." 
Two main types of evidence are presented to support the free market theory. One 
is the cross-sectional study of the relationship between inward and outward trade 
orientation, on the one hand, and growth on the other. The other is the correlation 
between price distortions and economic growth. Both these studies focus on the main 
arguments of the free market theory, namely, that trade is a way of exploring comparative 
advantage and price is the indicator for the efficient allocation of resources. 
A study made by the World Bank and subsequently publicized in the 1987 World 
Development Report shows the relationship between growth and trade orientation. 
According to the World Bank, an outward-oriented strategy is one in which trade and 
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industrial policies do not discriminate between production for the domestic market and 
exports, nor between purchases of domestic goods and foreign goods. In contrast, an 
inward-oriented strategy is one in which trade and industrial incentives are biased in 
favor of production for the domestic over the export market. This approach is known as 
import substitution. (World Bank, 1987, p. 78) 
Forty-one developing countries were classified according to their trade 
orientation strategies which were adopted in two periods, from 1963 to 1973 and from 
1973 to 1985. The countries' strategies were classified by combining four indicators: 
effective rate of protection for domestic market, use of direct controls such as quotas and 
import-licensing schemes, use of export incentives, and degree of exchange rate 
overvaluation. These criteria were used to classify the countries into strongly outward- 
oriented, moderately outward-oriented, moderately inward-oriented, and strongly 
inward-oriented economies. Then, the groups were plotted against some economic 
indicators. The results support the neoclassical position. Economic performance of the 
outward-oriented economies has been broadly superior to that of the inward-oriented 
economies in almost all respects, according to the study. 
Figure 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 present the economic performance of the forty-one 
countries for two of these indicators: the growth in real GDP and in real GNP per capita. 
During both periods, there is a clear descending pattern from strongly outward-oriented 
to the strongly inward-oriented economies. Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong 
enjoy the best performance and are strongly outward-oriented, according to the study's 
criteria. 
The neoclassical argument says that price distortions can influence economic 
growth. The higher the price distortion is, the greater the adverse effect on growth. The 
World Bank studied the extent of price distortions in developing countries in the 1970s 
and their impact on growth. Its conclusion, publicized in the 1983 World Development 
Report, is that during the 1970s "price distortions were serious in many developing 
countries" and "those countries with the worst distortions experienced significantly lower 
domestic saving and lower output per unit of investment, thus leading to slower growth." 
(1983, p. 57) 
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Figure 4.1. Real GDP Growth for Groups of Countries with Different Trade Orientation 
Source: From World Development Report 1987, pg. 84. 
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Figure 4.2. Real GNP per Capita Growth for Groups of Countries with Different Trade 
Orientation 
Source: From World Development Report 1987, pg. 84. 
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Figure 4.3. Real GNP per Capita Growth for Countries with Different Trade 
Orientation, 1963-73 
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Figure 4.4. Real GNP per Capita Growth for Countries with Different Trade 
Orientation, 1973-85 
Source: From World Development Report 1987, pg. 86. 
The average growth rate for the ten countries with low distortions was 7 percent. 
This was 2 percentage points higher than the average for the sample. On the other hand, 
the ten countries with high distortions had growth rates that were on average 2 
percentage points lower than the average for the whole sample. (1983, p. 61) Figure 4.5 
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presents the World Bank's findings. South Korea had the fourth-best mark on the 
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Figure 4.5. Price Distortion and Economic Growth 
Source: After World Development Report 1983, pg. 62. 
2. Simulated Free Market (SM) Theory 
Some neoclassical economists maintain that the government's intervention was an 
important factor in the NICs development. But, in their opinion, this was only insofar as 
it promoted exports and offset market failures. Wade (1990, p. 24) captures the main 
point of this theory: 
This simulated free market (SM) theory differs from the FM theory 
in terms of the distinction between a free (or liberal) trade regime and a 
neutral trade regime....the latter is one where any incentive for domestic 
producers to sell on the domestic market rather than export, because of 
protection, is offset by export subsidies....So a neutral trade regime may 
go with some government intervention, including protection of the 
domestic market. The important point....is that the incentive effect of such 
protection in biasing sales toward the domestic market should be offset, in 
aggregate, by export promotion measures. The Far Eastern countries have 
managed to do this, according to Bhagwati, which is a large part of the 
reason why they have been so successful compared to others which have 
not. 
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Frederick Berger (1979, p. 64) expresses his belief "that the crux of the Korean 
example is that the active interventionist attitude of the State has been aimed at applying 
moderate incentives which are very close to the relative prices of products and factors that 
would prevail in a situation of free trade." Wade (1990, p. 23) refers to the argument 
posed by Jadish Bhagwati in favor of the export promotion (EP) strategy, which is in 
accordance with simulated free market theory. 
An EP strategy is a set of policies which results in the average 
effective exchange rate for importables being approximately equal to that 
for exportables. The most important thing the government of an 
underdeveloped country can do to promote growth, he implies, is to 
maintain an EP strategy, and this requires government intervention. 
It is important not to confuse the idea of simulated free market with import 
substitution. While the former implies trade neutrality, not the deliberate promotion of 
one sector over another, the later discourages imports, and hence indirectly discourages 
exports, in an effort to protect the domestic market. 
In "The Third World Survey" (The Economist, September, 1989), Clive Crook 
states that South Korea built "a complicated system of interventions that broadly offset 
each other in their impact on trade (p. 6). This argument fits the simulated free market 
model. Regarding the impact of this intervention on price, writes Crook, South Korea 
"intervened, but in ways that left prices comparatively free to do their resource-allocating 
job" (p. 35). 
3. Governed Market (GM) Theory 
The governed market hypothesis was formulated by Wade (1990) in his book 
Governing the Market. Previous to his conclusions, however, were those economists 
whose theories stressed the importance of government action in implementing the 
institutions of capitalism in a more effective way than the methods of implementation of a 
free market economy. Critics who make this government-leadership argument state that 
the principal factor behind the East Asian success is government intervention. Parvez 
Hasan (1976, p. 29), draws attention to an apparent paradox in the Korean economy: 
...the economy depends in large measure on private enterprise 
operating under highly centralized government guidance. In Korea the 
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...the economy depends in large measure on private enterprise 
operating under highly centralized government guidance. In Korea the 
government's role is considerably more direct than that of merely setting 
the broad rules of the game and influencing the economy indirectly 
through market forces. In fact, the government seems to be a participant 
and often the determining influence in nearly all business decisions. This 
arrangement is generally acceptable to the private sector presumably 
because the success of business enterprises depends on government 
protection and support in various forms, including in some instances 
substantial subsidies. 
Edward Mason and associates (1980, p. 254) draw a similar conclusion about business- 
government relations in South Korea: 
The rapid economic growth that began in South Korea in the early 
1960s and has accelerated since then has been a government-directed 
development in which the principal engine has been private enterprise. 
The relationship between a government committed to a central direction 
of economic development and a highly dynamic private sector that 
confronts the planning machinery with a continually changing structure of 
economic activities presents a set of interconnections difficult to penetrate 
and describe. Planning in South Korea, if it is interpreted to include not 
only policy formulation but also the techniques of policy implementation, 
is substantially more than indicative. The hand of government reaches 
down rather far into the activities of individual firms with its manipulation 
of incentives and disincentives. At the same time, the situation can in no 
sense be described in terms of a command economy. 
Wade attempted to propose a theory built on some ideas that could provide a 
basis from which economic analysis could be done and logical conclusions could be 
drawn. He states the basic ideas behind his theory (1990, p. 26): 
The governed market (GM) theory says that the superiority of East 
Asian economic performance is due in large measure to a combination of: 
(1) very high levels of productive investment, making for fast transfer of 
newer techniques into actual production; (2) more investment in certain 
key industries than would have occurred in the absence of government 
intervention; and (3) exposure of many industries to international 
competition, in foreign markets if not at home. These are the proximate 
causes. At a second level of causation, they are themselves the result, in 
important degree, of a set of government economic policies. Using 
incentives, controls, and mechanisms to spread risk, these policies enabled 
the government to guide, or govern, market processes of resource 
allocation so as to produce different production and investment outcomes 
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than would have occurred with either free market or simulated free market 
policies. At the third level of explanation, the policies have been permitted 
or supported by a certain kind of organization of the state and the private 
sector. 
The kind of organization of the state that the author mentions is, for the East 
Asian countries, authoritarian and corporatist. The first refers to the regulations by which 
rulers are chosen. Authoritarian means that the rulers "are selected by methods which 
give relatively little scope for the expression of popular sentiment." The second refers to 
relations between special interest groups and the state. "In corporatist systems the state 
charters or creates a small number of interest groups, giving them a monopoly of 
representation of occupational interests in return for which it claims the right to monitor 
them in order to discourage the expression of 'narrow', conflictful demands." (Wade, 
1990, p. 27) The author continues: 
The corporatist and authoritarian political arrangements of East 
Asia have provided the basis for market guidance. Market guidance was 
effected by augmenting the supply of investible resources, spreading or 
"socializing" the risks attached to long-term investment, and steering the 
allocation of investment by methods which combine government and 
entrepreneurial preferences. In particular, the governments guided the 
market by: (1) redistributing agricultural land in the early postwar period; 
(2) controlling the financial system and making private financial capital 
subordinate to industrial capital; (3) maintaining stability in some of the 
main economic parameters that affect the viability of long-term 
investment, especially the exchange rate, the interest rate, and the general 
price level; (4) modulating the impact of foreign competition in the 
domestic economy and prioritizing the use of scarce foreign exchange; (5) 
promoting exports; (6) promoting technology acquisition from 
multinational companies and building a national technology system; and 
(7) assisting particular industries. (Wade, 1990, p. 27-28) 
It is useful to summarize the main differences between the GM theory and the FM 
and SM theories as a conclusion of this chapter. Wade's words will be used to make this 
summary: 
The FM and SM theories emphasize efficient resource allocation 
as the principal general force for growth, and therefore interpret superior 
East Asian performance as the result of more efficient resource allocation 
than in the other LDCs or NICs. This more efficient resource allocation 
comes from more freely functioning markets, including closer integration 
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of domestic product markets into international markets. Hence these 
countries show the virtues of "getting the prices right," where "right" 
means domestic prices in line with international prices. The GM theory, 
on the other hand, emphasizes capital accumulation as the principal 
general force for growth, and interprets superior East Asian performance 
as the result of a level and composition of investment different from what 
FM or SM policies would have produced, and different, too, from what the 
"interventionist" economic policies pursued by many other LDCs would 
have produced. Government policies deliberately got some prices 
"wrong," so as to change the signals to which decentralized market agents 
responded, and also used nonprice means to alter the behavior of market 
agents. The resulting high level of investment generated fast turnover of 
machinery, and hence fast transfer of newer technology into actual 
production. (1990, p. 29) 
The analysis of the main policies adopted by the government, the response of the 
private sector, and the relation of these roles to the results obtained by South Korea in 
terms of economic growth can give the arguments to decide with side is right or close to 
being right. This is the scope of the next chapter. 
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V. THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE MARKET 
As discussed in Chapter II, there is no economy that is totally free market. Some 
degree of government intervention is expected. In South Korea, however, the government 
has been interventionist. This fact is generally recognized by economists, no matter what 
economic current of thinking they defend. This means that the role played by the 
government in the economy exceeds what is expected and tolerated by those who defend 
the free market as a way to achieve development. For those who defend government 
intervention, however, the result achieved by South Korea is an indication of the 
superiority of this approach when dealing with developing countries. This chapter is a 
discussion of the main policies adopted by the South Korean government, the response of 
the private sector, and the relation of these roles to relevant results in terms of growth. 
A. ANTECEDENTS OF THE HIGH-GROWTH PERIOD 
Under the Rhee government of the 1950s, Korean policy was preoccupied by 
largely political considerations, and the government attached no particular importance to 
either economic growth or exports (Jones and Sakong, 1979, 272-273). Rhee's primary 
goal was reunification and he even talked of a "march north" to enforce his priority 
(Woronoff, 1992, p. 95). Because of this, the government failed to take actions to 
improve the economic situation which was seriously damaged by the Korean War. The 
government resumed the policy of import substitution that was begun after the World 
War n. Under an import substitution strategy, domestic production replaces imports of 
non-durable consumer goods. Imports of these goods are discouraged through a set of 
restrictions. Korea's system of import restrictions created a bias against exports, with 
overvaluation of the exchange rate deterring exports, even though the government had a 
program of export subsidies. It also created a scarcity of foreign exchange. With a 
reduced volume of exports, the main source of foreign exchange was American aid. This 
situation of scarcity gave rise to rent-seeking activities with corruption as a consequence, 
leading to a distrust of the government. (Kwon, 1990, p. 34) 
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Despite this discouraging picture, some promising developments took place in the 
1950s. Several projects were undertaken that led industrial production to grow at over 10 
percent per year. These projects, however, were taken at the expense of the agricultural 
sector which was thrown into a depression with food prices reduced below the cost of 
domestic production. As agriculture accounted for over 40 percent of GNP and employed 
over 60 percent of the labour force, the result was to reduce the growth of GNP to the 
point where it was overtaken by population growth. Land reform had been completed and 
the long-standing problem of rural unrest was solved. Only unfavorable pricing policies 
prevented peasants from investing in their own land. There was a rise in demand for 
education at all levels. Illiteracy dropped from 78 percent in 1945 to 27.9 percent in 
1960. (Michell, 1988, p. 10-11) 
After 1958, export incentives were increased. Subsidized credit was made 
available to exporters for up to 75 percent of their production costs in 1959 (Rodrik, 
1994, p. 6). In 1961, the civilian government, which was established in 1960, adopted a 
liberalization philosophy. The exchange rate was depreciated from 50 won to the dollar 
in January 1960 to 130 won to the dollar in February 1961. At the same time, the 
multiple exchange rate system was replaced with a single, unified, floating exchange rate 
system, import controls were liberalized, and subsidies were provided to exports 
(Balassa, 1990, p. 4). The effect of these measures was not yet felt when a military coup 
led President Park into power. 
B. THE PERIOD OF RAPID GROWTH (1960s AND 1970s) 
Jones and Sakong (1979) argue that under Syngman Rhee the Republic of Korea 
was a "soft" state, but it subsequently turned into a "hard" state. This term "hard state" 
means that the policies decided by the government are enforced, with obligations placed 
on people. On the other hand, in a "soft state", the policies decided are often not 
enforced, if they are enacted at all. In fact, the Korean constitution provided for the 
state's role in the economy. It declares that "The state shall regulate and co-ordinate 
economic affairs within the limits necessary for the realization of social justice and for 
the development of a balanced national economy to fulfill the basic living requirements 
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of all citizens." Furthermore all mines and important resources were to be owned by the 
state while the state "shall encourage the foreign trade, and shall regulate and co-ordinate 
it." (1949 Constitution, Chapter 4, articles 111-118)1 
As Myrdal (1968, p. 66) said, "Even an authoritarian regime cannot record major 
achievement unless it can somehow mobilize acceptance, participation and co-operation 
amongst the people." General Park Chung Hee's measures, adopted after the military 
coup on May 16, 1961, could not have been successful if he had not worked in a 
favorable environment. Rather than military or political goals, he made economic 
advancement the top priority. This was what the population wanted the most. In South 
Korea there was an overriding impression of business as shady affair. Businessmen who 
grew rich were assumed to be corrupt. After the military coup, the most visible ones were 
arrested and their fortunes confiscated. These actions helped the new government to get 
credibility, and carry out its first five-year plan. 
According to Mark Clifford (1994, p. 49) "the men who framed policy in Korea 
in 1961 after Park took power made no secret of their belief that the country was not 
ready for a free market system." He transcribes this statement from the first five-year 
economic development plan, which translates this belief: "Throughout the plan period, 
the economic system will be a form of 'guided capitalism,' in which the principle of free 
enterprise and respect for the freedom and initiative of free enterprise will be observed, 
but in which the government will either directly participate in or indirectly render 
guidance to the basic industries and other important fields." 
The traditional Confucian economic thought regards agriculture as the basis of a 
nation's strength. Reflecting this belief, in June 1961, the military government enacted a 
Farm Products Prices Maintenance Law in order to maintain prices of agricultural 
products and to ensure the stability of this sector of the economy. The agricultural 
policies of the 1950s were reversed. At that time the agricultural prices were held down 
below the cost of production. A system of rural credit was created, which merged the 
agricultural co-operatives with the Agricultural Bank. In the first year after the merger 
138 million dollars were lent to farmers permitting them to pay old debts and make new 
1
 The wording remained unchanged through the revisions of 1962 and 1969. 
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investments. As a result, between 1962 and 1965 agricultural output increased at an 
annual average rate of 8.8 per cent. (Michell, 1988, p. 31) This reinforced the explanation 
given by the Economic Planning Board about the contribution of agriculture for the 
earlier years of high growth. This point was addressed in chapter III, section B. 
The economic growth in South Korea has been the result of an interplay between 
the government and the private market. The government was responsible for setting the 
rules and influencing decision making in the private sector in line with its view of an 
appropriate economic policy. The private sector responded to the economic climate 
generated, taking advantage of the incentives provided by the government, and pursuing 
the most benefit for its enterprises. The principal aspects of this relationship, and their 
impact on the economic growth will now be presented. 
1. Public Enterprises 
In a free market economy, the government is expected to provide only those 
goods and services where it has clear comparative advantage, namely public goods and 
services. It is common in developing countries to add more commercial and financial 
tasks to the government's duties. Jon Woronoff (1992, p. 98) says that Korea "undertook 
all this and more." He continues: "[T]o accomplish these functions, the government 
established over twenty special corporations,...There were housing and highway agencies, 
a telecommunications authority, tourism and trade promotion bodies, and several banks." 
An explanation for this encroachment on the private sector, in Woronoff s words could 
be "a lack of capital or managerial ability among existing businessmen, especially in 
earlier years." 
This explanation, however, is based on two questionable assumptions: first, the 
new business opportunities had to be carried out by existing businessmen and second, the 
government had more expertise than the private sector. It is also inconsistent with the 
level of education that South Korea had at that time. Michell (1988, p. 90) states that the 
government used public enterprises to seek economies of scale. In his view "the 
government not only planned and guided, but actually created growth." He presents data 
showing that "public enterprises contributed just over 12 percent of value-added in 
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manufacturing throughout the 1960s."(p.91) Jones and Sakong (1980) point that these 
enterprises were established "particularly in basic industries characterized by a high 
degree of linkages and scale economies." For them "the public sector fulfilled the classic 
role of a leading sector, in which above-average growth stimulates the rest of the 
economy." They argue that this sector in South Korea was "relatively efficient by 
international standards." 
In spite of this relative success, Woronoff (1992, p. 99) describes some 
consequences of this approach, which in fact would be expected: 
...although some of these operations were well run, it was hard to 
avoid a bureaucratization that stifled initiative and masked profitability. 
Some cases became so acute that the corporations had to be wound down 
or sold off while others were subsidized. Thus, in later years, planners 
definitely preferred leaving productive ventures to private entrepreneurs 
and there was mounting interest in privatization of existing state 
enterprises. With this, the trend which had led to a rather large public 
sector was reversed. 
2. The Financial Sector 
One decisive instrument used by the government to carry out its plans was the 
financial system. Growth in South Korea was sustained largely at the expense of 
repressing the financial institutions and their development. The main strategy was to 
ensure loans at a low rate of interest for entrepreneurs that were willing to take on 
activities considered strategic by the government. Cho (1990, p. 227) states that "the 
Korean government was very reluctant to leave the determination of interest rates and 
resource allocation to the market function." 
After the military coup, President Park quickly seized control of this system. 
According to Michell (1988, p. 67), "in 1970 the government directly controlled 96.4 
percent of financial assets; this proportion had decreased to 84.4 percent in 1978 and 82 
percent in 1980." Even the commercial banks had their interest rates controlled directly, 
and most made funds available according to the government order. As Mark Clifford 
states "the funds that business needed to expand were available only through the state- 
owned banks, and for the next twenty years the government approved every significant 
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loan that was made." With the government controlling the banks, it was easier to obtain 
credit for projects in sectors regarded as "strategic" in the government's plans, usually at 
exceptionally low interest rates. 
Kwon (1990, p.36) tells that "very early on, political leaders in Korea saw the 
potential of private business as an engine of economic growth." Likewise, "business saw 
in government a primary source of scarce capital that it badly needed." In fact it was a 
marriage of convenience. Kim (1990, p. 191) points out that in fact there was a tripartite 
relationship between government, business, and financial institutions. The objective of 
the enterprises was growth maximization rather than profit maximization. The goal was 
to achieve a minimum size, at which the government would be unable to allow 
bankruptcy. The government was the referee. The banks simply responded to the 
government's commands. As Kim concludes "a natural and inevitable consequence of 
this tripartite relationship was the increase in insolvent firms or nonperforming assets on 
the balance sheets of the banks." 
In 1965, following recommendations of the U.S. aid mission report written by 
Gurley, Patrick, and Shaw, a major interest rate reform was implemented. The maximum 
rate of interest on time deposits was doubled and bank loan rates were also raised. The 
objective of this reform was to stimulate the growth of the financial system, and through 
this, to contribute to growth in output. In the early 1970s, however, the government went 
back to a low-interest-rate policy. Throughout the 1970s, the real interest rates of bank 
loans and deposits fluctuated around zero.(Cho, 1990, p.227) 
This policy permitted the government to guide the allocation of resources toward 
its targeted activities. But, it also had secondary effects. Not surprisingly, the black 
market flourished and became one major source of capital. Mark Clifford (1994, p. 103) 
says that the size of this market was "more than one-third the size of the official loan 
market." Another effect is the socialization of risks. It is clear that someone had to pay 
for the cheap credit made available to targeted sectors. Clifford (1994, p. 62) remarks 
that in 1965, when the interest rate reform was adopted, "the interest rates were doubled 
on savings accounts, to as much as 30 percent for one-year deposits." At the same time, 
he continues "bank loan rates were raised, but only to a maximum of 26 percent." At first 
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glance, it seems that the banks were losing money on every loan. However, as Clifford 
continues "the Bank of Korea made up the negative interest rate spread to banks through 
other concessions." One of these "concessions" was pointed out by Kim (1990, p. 190) 
when he remarks that "to make up for losses to the banks due to inverted rates, interest at 
the rate of 3.5 per annum was paid to banks on reserve deposits with the central bank." 
In fact, the government distorted the allocation of resources by changing the 
parameters for the analysis of investments. The expected net present value on projects 
was increased by cheap credit that did not reflect the opportunity cost of money. 
Ensuring loans to selected industries regardless of their financial performance, the 
perceived risk of investment was changed. In fact, this risk was assumed by the 
government. This shift in liability encouraged firms to undertake projects that they 
otherwise would have declined. 
Cho(1990, p. 234) points out that the financial control in South Korea led to an 
economic concentration and had a negative effect on income distribution. He says "if the 
cost of bank credit is set below the real rate of return of capital investment, borrowing 
from a bank entails rent." Most rent go to the privileged borrowers. Once they were able 
to secure a continuous flow of credit, they could grow faster than otherwise, leaving 
competitors way behind. That was one reason why privileged firms in South Korea grew 
fast and became big. Since the rate on deposit was set below market value, it worked as a 
tax for the depositor and a subsidy for the borrower. This means that a transfer of income 
from depositors to firms occurred. Cho continues "it also induces the method of 
production in a more capital-intensive way and tends to reduce the wage share of the 
total output of the economy." 
3. Business Concentration 
Another consequence of the relationship among government, banks, and business 
was the rise in big business conglomerates. In the earlier days of rapid economic 
development, the government favored big business by placing resources in the hands of 
those entrepreneurs who had demonstrated their competitiveness in the international 
arena (Kwon, 1990, p. 41). This policy of backing winners led to the emergence of large 
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groups. Lee(1990, p. 330) points out that "the government bailout practices substantially 
reduced the downside risk of business ventures and thus encouraged entrepreneurs to 
launch high-risk, high-return, large-scale projects, which contributed greatly to the 
emergence of big business conglomerates in Korea." According to Lee, (1990, p.42) the 
market share of the top five jaebuls (as these businesses were called) in terms of sales in 
manufacturing was 15.7 percent in 1978, increasing to 23 percent in 1985. 
Although business concentration facilitated the government's role in directing 
credit to targeted economic activities, undesirable effects came from this situation. As 
these firms had easy access to credit, they had high financial leverage. Kwon (1990, p.41) 
points out that "from 1984 through 1986, more than one third of the largest 10 percent of 
the firms listed with the Korean Stock Exchange had equity ratios2 below 5 percent." As 
he states, this "tends to diminish the resilience of an economy in the face of adverse 
economic shock." Another consequence pointed out by Kwon is the concentration of land 
ownership. Approximately 65.2 percent of the private land is now owned by the top 5 
percent in income (p. 42). 
As the Korean economy became dominated by a relatively small number of big 
firms, the lack of internal competition emerged. The interaction between big business 
and government means a mix of business and politics. The firms attained a high degree 
of autonomy and political power in this process. In "The Third World Survey" (The 
Economist, 1989, p. 39), the journalist refers to this problem: 
A recent report from South Korea's Presidential Commission on 
Economic Restructuring measured the extent of competition in the 
country's markets for more than 2,500 goods. It said that 21% of these 
markets were run by monopolies and 57% by oligopolies....The recent 
wave of strikes for higher wages,...,is widely seen as a political struggle 
for shares of the national income, with the government on one side and 
workers on the other. 
4. The Export-Oriented Strategy 
"The adjective [sic] 'miracle' applies comfortably to Korea's trade record" (Petri 
1990, p. 53). This statement helps in understanding how important trade is in South 
:
 The equity ratios are the ratio of average equity to total value (equity plus debt). 
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Korea's development. Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of export growth rates over the 
1965-86 period for all countries for which data was available. Korean exports grew at 
23.1% per annum, more rapidly than in any other country. In less than three decades, 
Korea transformed an internationally dependent, nonindustrial economy into the world's 
twelfth largest trading power. This achievement justifies the importance credited to the 
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Figure 5.1. World Distribution of Export Growth Rates 
Source: World Development Report, 1988. "From Petri, 1990, p. 54." 
The export-oriented strategy was not a priority in the First Five-Year Plan (1962- 
66). Mark Clifford (1994, p. 54) relates that in the draft of the plan there was a section 
examining how exports could be expanded and that "the members of the revolutionary 
council initially deleted this section, for they saw little hope for growth." This is 
consistent with the exchange rate appreciation that happened between 1962 and 1964, 
since the inflation was not compensated by devaluation. The resulting deterioration of the 
balance of payments, in turn, led to the adoption of increased import restrictions and the 
re-establishment of the multiple exchange rate system (Balassa, 1990, p. 4). It seems that 
the shortage of foreign exchange, some unexpected success in the export sector, and the 
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indication by the U.S. authorities that economic aid was soon to be terminated, forced the 
government to turn to an outward-looking strategy. 
In this context, some reforms were initiated in 1964. The unification of the 
exchange rates, devaluation of the exchange rate from 130 to 247 won to the dollar, 
import liberalization, and incentives to exports were major steps taken at that time. Also 
that year, the government-sponsored Korea Trade Promotion Association (KOTRA) was 
founded to promote exports and to carry out market research abroad. Balassa(1990, p. 5) 
summarizes the government-exporters relation: 
Exporters were given the right to import their inputs duty free and 
without restrictions; they were also provided generous wastage 
allowances3 for the importation of raw materials. In 1965, these incentives 
were extended to indirect exports (the production of domestic inputs for 
exports) and increased credit preferences were also provided to exporters. 
In the following year, tariff exemptions were granted to the importers of 
machinery and equipment used to produce direct and indirect exports and 
accelerated depreciation allowances were introduced. Furthermore, inputs 
used in export production were free of indirect taxes and exporters 
received a 50 percent reduction in their income tax. 
"The adoption of the outward-oriented development strategy was accompanied by 
reform of the financial system" (Balassa, 1990, p. 5). Real interest rates, which had been 
negative, turned strongly positive in 1965. The result was a substantial increase in the 
savings deposits, a great part of which came from the curb4 market. Balassa also 
indicates the favorable external environment as another decisive factor on the success of 
South Korea as an exporter country. This was translated in a context of diminishing 
protection worldwide and in the important U.S. market, and low competition from other 
developing countries.(p. 57) 
Properly valued currency is essential for a country to achieve good results in its 
trade. The Korean government generally maintained the real value of the won near the 
level needed for current account balance (Petri, 1990, p. 56). The main exception to this 
3
 Exporters and suppliers of exporters were given the right to duty-free imports of raw materials and 
intermediate inputs up to a limit. This limit was determined on the basis of firms' and industries' input- 
output coefficients plus a margin of "wastage allowance". The imports acquired under the wastage 
allowance could be sold domestically, often at a high profit. 
4
 The term Curb market here has the same meaning as black market. 
44 
generalization occurred during the last half of the 1970s, when Korea sought to shift its 
economic structure toward heavy industry. This shift in policy and the effects of the two 
oil shocks, led the government to give greater priority to price stability, which is 
threatened by devaluation. This resulted in an import substitution strategy, and export 
growth suffered. The effect of this policy can be seen in Figure 3.2. There was a 
decreasing tendency on both exports and imports in that period. 
Although the Korean government has been interventionist, the export sector has 
enjoyed a special situation. In effect, exporters were largely exempt from trade barriers. 
It is reasonable to make the point that the export sector worked as a free market. Petri 
(1990, p. 69) argues that the allocation of capital was "almost efficient" in the export 
sector. This means that even the sectoral objectives of the government's lending policy 
were circumvented by the entrepreneurs. He argues that these bank loans went to large 
conglomerates, which were involved in an unusually wide range of economic activities. 
The internal capital markets of large conglomerates "may have 'made up' for efficient 
formal capital markets by channeling capital into more efficient allocations than implied 
by policy objectives guiding bank credit." So, for example, one conglomerate that was 
involved both in the chemical industry and garment industry could have received 
subsidized credit for the former and channeled it to the latter. This way the efficient 
allocation of resources was achieved in spite of the government sectoral bias. 
In the late 1980s, South Korea became the most open of the world's larger 
economies. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of a measure of openness, the sum of 
exports plus imports to GNP, for medium to large countries, here defined as having 
population of 20 million or more. In this measure, South Korea was the most open 
economy in this group of countries. 
Mark Clifford (1994, p. 56) calls attention to a problem caused by the government 
interference targeting the export sector: 
Alice Amsden, a scholar who has studied the development of 
Korea's business groups, cites data showing that in the mid-1970s half the 
companies polled thought that export targeting had negative effects for 
them....unprofitable export sales, diversion of production from the 
domestic to overseas markets and price cutting. But what companies lost 
on export sales they usually made up in profits in the protected domestic 
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market. This strategy of forcing domestic consumers to subsidize exports 
was Korea's way of allowing Korean firms to amass the profits necessary 
for continued expansion. It reflect Korea's decision to organize an 
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5. The Heavy and Chemical Industries Plan 
In 1972, the Korean government launched its long-term plan for Heavy and 
Chemical Industries (HCI). It was a significant change in policy. Capital-intensive 
industries producing intermediate goods and heavy machinery were favored over 
traditional labor-intensive industries. A target of $10 billion in exports and a per capita 
GNP of $1,000 by 1980 was set (Clifford, 1994, p. 104). The government also decided 
where plants would be built, what their capacity would be, and which companies would 
build them (p. 105). The plan identified six leading industries: steel, chemicals, non- 
ferrous metals, machinery, shipbuilding and the electrical industry. 
This change in policy meant a change in priority in the allocation of domestic 
credit and access to foreign credit. The cost of credit to these industries was reduced 
through preferential interest rates. Incentives were given in the form of exemption from 
corporate income taxes and accelerated depreciation provisions. The application of these 
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measures affected the pattern of investment and the economy as a whole. In fact, it was a 
setback in the outward-looking strategy. 
This plan was launched at a time when the world was facing the adverse effects 
of the first oil shock. The increase in oil prices forced most countries into economic 
setbacks. Inflation was rising. In an attempt to control inflation, the exchange rate was 
maintained constant, despite domestic inflation. This aggravated the situation of reduced 
availability of funds for traditional export industries. As a result, the export sector was 
adversely affected. The export growth rates declined after 1976 and the volume of 
exports fell in real terms in 1979 (Balassa, 1990, p. 7). At the same time fixed investment 
increased. Since a great part of these fixed assets were imported and financed by foreign 
borrowing, this contributed to a rapid increase in imports and external debt. These 
tendencies in imports and exports can be seen in Figure 3.2. 
The result of this plan for the Korean economy is a subject of controversy. 
Michell (1988, p. 53) summarizes the plan's accomplishments in this way: 
Of the six industries only one, shipbuilding, which required large 
number of skilled workers, was totally suited to factor endowments in the 
Republic of Korea. The electrical industry was to be concerned as much 
with power-generating equipment as with consumer electronics. In 
practice only consumer electronics developed rapidly, in line with the 
country's factor endowments....the electronics industry was a success...but 
only limited credit for this can go to government planners, who envisaged 
an electrical industry with a quite different structure. In theory the 
machinery industry looked like a potential winner, for it too required large 
numbers of skilled workers. Actually it was again a failure, as it had been 
in the 1960s. The reason appears to lie both in products and in production 
processes....The steel industry turned out, against prediction, to be highly 
efficient and in 1979 was the second most important export sector....The 
non-ferrous metal and chemical industries were largely intended for 
import substitution....The fact that their value-added did not increase in 
the 1970s suggests that these industries had only limited success. The 
extreme case...was the Korea Aluminium Company, which produced 
about a quarter of the Republic's needs at a price well above the 
international level. Even that price was said to be heavily subsidized by 
KECO, so that it stood at 50 percent less than production costs. All 
companies requiring aluminium were obliged to buy one quarter of their 
needs from this company in order to obtain import licenses. 
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Michell also quotes Professor Hong Wontack when he talks about this policy of 
making capital cheap in order to induce entrepreneurs to undertake capital-intensive 
production. He says that it "may be profitable to the subsidized private entrepreneur but 
may imply a loss for the country as a whole when calculated in terms of real opportunity 
costs of capital." Moreover, he continues, "the net effect of these policies may be to 
reduce employment opportunities and to retard the growth of GNP."(p.54) 
Dollar and Sokoloff (1990, p. 140) draw this conclusion from the HCI experience: 
One thing that does emerge clearly from the Korean experience is 
that the government cannot simply choose to 'create comparative 
advantage' in a particular manufacturing industry. If the government 
directs investment to an industry for which the country does not have the 
necessary technological capability, the likely outcome is that rapid growth 
in the capital-labor ratio will be offset by relatively poor TFP [Total Factor 
Productivity] performance and that the country's firms will not emerge as 
successful exporters. (Korean petrochemicals is an example.) On the other 
hand, in industries where the country's firms can develop the necessary 
technological base, targeted investment will accelerate the shift in 
comparative advantage in the direction of these industries. 
As a long-term strategy, favorable results were expected for the 1980s. Wade 
(1990, p. 319) points out the success of the plan saying that "from the perspective of the 
mid-1980s and beyond the results do not look nearly as bad as in 1978-80, when many of 
the negative evaluations were made." He states that "by 1984 60 percent of Korea's 
exports came from HCIs (in line with the targets set in 1973, at which time the figure was 
24 percent)." 
The "negative evaluations" that Wade refers to were of the HCI plan which had 
been pointed to as responsible in great part for the slow-down in the economy in the late 
1970s. Figure 3.1 shows the drop in GDP growth that occurred at that time. The negative 
growth that occurred in 1980 is in part explained by the turbulent political climate that 
followed the President Park's assassination and by that year's harvest failure. However, 
the slow-down in the growth has much to do with the change in policy toward heavy and 
chemical industries. The overvaluation of the exchange rate that had a negative effect on 
exports, and the limitation of capital for the other sectors, which was a direct result of 
this policy, hit the South Korean economy in a very dramatic way. 
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C. THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE 1980s 
Since 1979 Korea has pursued a slow, but deliberate policy of liberalization. The 
government has been withdrawing from intervention in the policy areas of domestic 
finance, import barriers, and direct export promotion, playing a larger role in social, 
technological and manpower development. The adverse effect that previous policies had 
in the economy in the late 1970s, especially those favoring the heavy and chemical 
industry, called for reconsideration of the policy framework. The economy also had 
become too large and complex to be subjected to control by the government. The Fifth 
Five-Year Plan, which went into effect in 1982, clearly shows the government's intention 
to reinforce the market mechanism. Here are some insights of this Plan as presented by 
Balassa(1990,p. 7). 
In order to sustain long-term growth of exports and the economy as 
a whole, import liberalization is essential. There is a limit to which a 
country can improve its industrial structure without import liberalization. 
Furthermore, a country cannot possibly hope to improve its price 
competitiveness while its cost of living rises due to import 
restriction... (p. 17) 
The single most important change in government industrial policy 
during the Fifth Five-Year Plan period will be the reduction of the 
government's role in promoting so-called strategic industries. Investment 
choices will be left to the initiative of the private sector and the 
government will provide only the general framework in which such 
choices will be made by private entrepreneurs in cooperation with their 
bankers and financiers, (pp. 22-23) 
In addition, special efforts will be made to maintain the real 
interest rate on bank loans and deposits at a positive level and gradually 
reduce the scope of policy preference loans, (p. 31) 
Making a greater use of the market mechanism also implies 
equalizing in terms of competition and policy incentives for all 
industries....During the Fifth Five-Year Plan period the government plans 
to gradually phase out specific incentives and provide instead generalized 
uniform incentives for investment in all industries, (p. 31) 
Needless to say, in practice the government did not stick to the principles as 
stated in the Plan, and the pace of the reforms has been slower than desired. As Petri 
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(1990, p. 65) states, "the frequently cited liberalization ratios understate the extent of 
protection." Special laws restrict the entry of goods in order to protect selected sectors 
such as telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and technology development. Agriculture 
is also an exception to liberalization. It has received higher-than-world-market prices 
while being sheltered from foreign competition. 
Although the previously stated considerations are valid, the announced reforms 
became a turning point toward a new period in the Korean economy. Some of the most 
effective tools used by the government to intervene in the economy, including direct 
subsidies, preferential access to subsidized credit, extensive quantitative import 
restrictions, and high tariffs, have been eliminated or reduced. 
Although the events of 1980 were a threshold for South Korea in terms of the 
government's role in the economy, important steps toward liberalization were taken in 
previous periods. However, these previous experiences were not persistent, and constant 
reversals took place. What made the 1980s liberalization unique is that it was a persistent 
process and that the government was conscious of its necessity. 
1. Exchange Rate Policy 
In terms of the exchange rate policy, it is appropriate to say that the Korean 
government generally maintained a properly valued currency. The main exception to this 
generalization occurred during the last half of the 1970s when a policy favoring heavy 
and chemical industries was pursued. In February 1980, however, a new exchange rate 
regime was adopted, which is still in effect. Under the new system, the dollar exchange 
rate is determined by movements of the exchange rates of major trading partners as well 
as by other factors affecting Korea's external position (Koo and Park, 1990, p. 81). 
2. Import Liberalization 
The import liberalization process was accelerated in the 1980s. Figure 5.3 clearly 
demonstrates this tendency. It is also clear that this has been a long process. The first 
significant step was taken in the mid-1960s. In 1967 the "positive" list of admissible 
imports was replaced by a "negative" list of products whose importation required 
government authorization. This meant automatic approval for imports of commodities 
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unless they were explicitly restricted. During the 1970s, some of this progress was 
reversed. In fact, in that period there was an inward-orientation tendency in the economy, 
including an increase in tariffs. From the late 1970s on, the liberalization was resumed 
with a gradual reduction in tariffs and in quantitative restrictions (QRs). While in 1967 
there was a one-stage approach in the sense that there was a sudden jump by loosening 
the quantitative restrictions, the liberalization that began in the late 1970s followed a 
multistage approach by using the system of "advance notices." Under this system, those 
sectors affected by liberalization measures were informed in advance, thus giving them 
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3. Financial Liberalization 
Financial liberalization has been both arduous and important. That is because 
repression in this sector was the main tool used by the government to intervene in the 
economy. Yet considerable progress has been made in giving financial institutions 
greater freedom to set their own prices and to attract and allocate funds. A tentative first 
step was made in 1973 when the government transferred to the Korea Traders 
Association its shares in the Commercial Bank of Korea. The denationalization of 
commercial banks, however, occurred between 1981 and 1983. The government turned 
all nationwide citybanks over to private ownership, and reduced its control over day-to- 
day operations. It is also true that banks were left very vulnerable because a substantial 
part of their outstanding loans remained policy related and the government remained in 
control of the interest rates. 
Although the government maintained interest rate ceilings on bank deposits and 
loans, the real interest rate of interest was turned positive, in contrast to the negative real 
rates prevalent throughout most of the 1970s. In 1984, a band of rates ranging from 10 to 
10.5 percent a year was introduced to permit banks to charge different rates on the basis 
of borrowers' creditworthiness (Kim, 1990, p. 200). It was a very narrow band but a first 
step in changing the previous policy, which stipulated a fixed ceiling of, for example, 
10%. This band was widened and the upper limit raised to 11.5 percent at the end of the 
year. Banks' operations were facilitated in the early 1980s, when hundreds of regulations 
and directives were abolished or simplified (Kim, 1990, p. 200). 
A very significant development in finance reform was the abolition, in June of 
1982, of the preferential lending rate system previously used to subsidize the so-called 
strategic sectors (World Bank, 1987, p. 82). This, together with the maintenance of 
positive real interest rates, served to reduce the distortion in financial costs among 
different sectors. In contrast, the promotion of small-and-medium-sized firms was 
highlighted. Commercial banks were required to extend at least 35 percent of their loans 
to these firms (Kim, 1990, p. 201). Figure 5.4 (A, B and C) reflects the financial 
favoritism to certain sectors, and the tendency to neutrality after the reforms of the 1980s. 
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Panel A shows the favoritism given to heavy and chemical industries. Beginning 
in 1974, the year in which the HCI began to claim a decidedly larger share of preferential 
loans, the gap in effective borrowing cost began to widen in its favor. This disparity 
began to recede in 1984, thus approaching neutrality. A similar bias can be seen in panel 
B. At first, in favor of the large industries, with the reforms of the 1979-80, an abrupt 
change occurred in favor of the light industries, which also soon approached a state of 
neutrality. A preference was accorded to export vis-ä-vis domestic industries, being 
maintained throughout the South Korea's high-growth period. This situation was not 
observed during the import-substitution period of the mid-1970s. It was reestablished 
after that. 
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Figure 5.4 - Ratio of Borrowing Costs for Selected Industrial Sectors 
Source: World Bank, 1987, p. 43. 
4. Preferential Credit Policy 
Another important step in the process of liberalization was the reduction of the 
scope of directed credit toward selected sectors of the economy. Credit preferences to 
capital-intensive industries, which had been the main policy during the 1970s, were 
eliminated. The seven existing promotional laws governing machinery, electronics, 
textiles, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, petrochemicals, and shipbuilding were 
replaced in 1985 by the Industrial Development Law (World Bank, 1987, p. 105). The 
industry-specific approach was replaced by a functional approach. Balassa (1990, p. 10) 
states that "it is of particular importance that the new industrial policy apparatus lacks a 
mechanism for 'picking winners,' who often turn out to be losers." 
Figure 5.5 (A, B, and C) presents data that the World Bank (1987, p. 52) regards 
as "indications that the reorientation of Korean industrial policy begun in 1979 is taking 
root". A converging trend toward neutrality in average returns to capital among industries 
can be seen. Large firms and small and medium firms earned rates of return that were 
roughly equal in 1972-73. This parity disappeared during the decade, as small and 
medium firms had better performance. It converged again in the period between 1982 
and 1984. A similar converging trend appears when returns on exports are compared with 
returns on the domestic sector. In the 1974-79 period, exports had significantly less 
return. That was the period that the government favored heavy and chemical industry. 
When the heavy industry's return is compared with that of light industry, it is evident that 
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the former lags behind for almost the whole decade. The disparity was more severe 
between 1978 and 1980. After that, the trend toward neutrality started to emerge. 
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Figure 5.5 - Trends in the Ratio of Industrial Performance for Selected 
Industrial Sectors (Average Returns to Capital Measure5) 
Source: World Bank, 1987, p. 53. 
Measured by the profits to assets ratio. 
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5. Income Tax Reform 
An important step that helped economy to maintain sustained growth from the 
1980s on was the reduction in income tax implemented by the government between 1982 
and 1984. Chan (1990) studied the effect of changes of the Korean tax rate on tax 
revenue. His study focused on the above ten million won income group and the above 65 
million won income group. The findings of his research are shown in Table 5.1 and can 
be summarized as follows: 
Analysis of the tax cuts in the above ten million won income group 
showed that lowering marginal tax rates contributed to income growth and 
higher level of tax revenue even with a falling tax rate. However, with the 
first installment of the tax cut in 1982, tax revenues fell with the fall in tax 
rate for taxpayers with incomes above 65 million won. This result makes 
sense because the taxpayers knew the 1984 tax cut was coming.... 
Conversely, the reduction in tax rate in 1984 caused a rise in tax revenue 
for this high-income group. 
Table 5.1. Effect of the Tax Cut of the 1980s 
Above 10 Million Won Tax Brackel ts Above 65 Million Won Tax ] Brackets 
Year Tax Tax Taxable Tax Tax Tax Taxable Tax 
rate payers Income Revenue rate payers Income Revenue 








1980 35-70 22,143 533.8 222.5 60-70 764 179.5 113.4 
1981 40-70 22,443 525.5 186.8 65-70 742 151.4 95.4 
1982 32-62 28,198 597.3 200.9 56-62 748 127.3 70.1 
1983 32-62 34,968 712.0 233.7 62 854 126.8 69.1 
1984 21-55 59,249 1,286.3 343.1 55 1,586 246.3 118.1 
1986 24-55 83,186 1,784.9 470.6 55 2,240 298.8 140.1 
1987 24-55 94,404 2,051.2 561.0 55 3,245 415.2 194.2 
1988 24-55 96,172 2,256.2 638.3 55 3,767 460.4 214.6 
Source: After Chan, Hyung Son (1990, p. 22, 26) 
*Note: In 1985 won. 
6. Liberalization and Economic Growth 
The effect that the process of liberalization had on economic growth in South 
Korea is an important element to consider when deciding what is responsible for the 
Korean performance. The persistent trend toward neutrality showed in figures 5.4 and 5.5 
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already suggests that liberalization had a positive effect on the allocation of resources. 
This points toward the private market as being more efficient than the government. The 
definitive argument would be the establishment of a systematic relationship between 
economic growth and liberalization. Because liberalization embraces measures that 
decrease government action in many sectors, such as regulation, trade, taxes, finance, to 
name a few, it is difficult to measure the impact of the overall liberalization on the 
macroeconomic variables. However, a relation can be found between some 
macroeconomic variables and some components of liberalization. This is what the 
regression analysis, as described below, tries to accomplish. 
The goal herein is to empirically discover the relationship between the economic 
growth rate, the degree of import liberalization, and the relative size of government 
spending. These are two important areas where the government's role in the economy 
can be easily perceived. Annual data for each of these series from 1956 to 1985 are 
presented on Table 5.2 and used in the analysis. 
The free market theory expects that the growth rate is positively correlated with 
import liberalization and negatively correlated with government spending. With the 
resources in the hands of the private sector and the country open to the world market, 
profit incentives lead entrepreneurs to allocate these resources to activities where the 
country has a comparative advantage6. On the other hand, if the interventionist argument 
holds, the opposite relationship is expected. 
The results shown in the regression analysis output, Table 5.3, conforms with the 
free market theory's expectations. The positive slope of the regression equation with 
respect to import liberalization shows that the more open to trade the economy is, the 
greater the estimated growth rate is. On the other hand, the negative slope regarding 
government spending shows that economic growth decreases when the government 
increases its spending. Of course it is not just the fact that the government spends that 
causes the expected growth rate to decrease. The government spends money collected 
from the private sector through taxes, which ultimately reduces private spending. Since 
The free market theory argument is discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. 
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the government is less efficient than the private sector in the allocation of resources, 
according to the free market theory, this causes the growth rate to decrease. 
Table 5.2. Import Liberalization, Government Spending and Growth (in percent) 
Year Inverted Total Degree of Overall Degree Share of GDP per GDP per Capita 
Tariffs Rate* Liberalization of Government Capita Growth - Three- 
(1) fromQRs Liberalization Spending in Growth year Moving 
(2) Avg(l)&(2) GNP(GY) Average 
1956 78.5 3.5 41.0 18.50 -4.080 
1957 73.9 6.4 40.2 18.36 4.584 1.032 
1958 70.0 6.3 38.2 19.09 2.593 2.710 
1959 60.1 4.7 32.4 19.11 0.954 0.615 
1960 63.3 5.0 34.2 22.11 -1.702 0.702 
1961 73.5 4.0 38.8 22.38 2.856 0.145 
1962 66.8 5.4 36.1 21.25 -0.717 2.745 
1963 66.3 0.4 34.4 17.69 6.097 3.985 
1964 66.2 2.0 34.1 13.60 6.576 5.329 
1965 65.5 5.9 37.8 15.68 3.313 6.543 
1966 65.7 9.1 37.4 16.70 9.740 4.947 
1967 65.5 48.7 57.1 18.16 1.787 6.765 
1968 62.9 46.6 54.8 19.63 8.769 7.292 
1969 63.2 43.8 53.5 18.77 11.321 8.830 
1970 63.1 43.0 53.1 17,42 6.399 8.263 
1971 63.3 43.7 53.5 16.76 7.070 5.808 
1972 63.5 40.1 51.8 14.79 3.954 7.822 
1973 67.5 41.3 54.4 12.92 12.441 7.491 
1974 67.5 40.5 54.0 15.33 6.077 7.952 
1975 67.5 38.5 53.0 16.97 5.338 7.504 
1976 67.5 40.9 54.2 17.26 11.097 8.271 
1977 70.8 40.8 55.8 17.51 8.379 9.175 
1978 70.7 52.2 61.5 18.05 8.048 7.471 
1979 74.4 58.8 66.6 18.08 5.985 3.452 
1980 74.4 60.1 67.3 21.01 -3.676 2.457 
1981 74.4 63.4 68.9 20.10 5.063 2.340 
1982 74.4 65.4 69.9 20.66 5.634 6.950 
1983 74.4 69.6 72.0 21.23 10.151 7.948 
1984 78.9 78.3 78.6 20.87 8.060 8.031 
1985 79.1 81.7 80.4 20.54 5.883 
Source: Liberalization: Kim (1990, p. 100). GY: Lee (1990, p. 267). 
Growth: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1984 and 1986. 
*The legal tariff rate is inverted in percentage form to show the degree of import liberalization in 
terms of tariffs. 
Some considerations about the numbers shown in the output are noteworthy. That 
the R-square adjusted of 27.4% was well below 100% was expected since so many 
potential variables influence economic growth. If the change in these two variables 
explain 27.4% of the variation from the mean of the economic growth, this can be 
considered significant. The t-ratio shows that the constant and the explanatory variables 
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coefficients are 2.66, 2.67 and -2.97 standard deviations from their respective means. 
This implies that these parameters are significantly different from zero and are not just 
the result of random error. The p-value gives significance to these parameters at a level 
greater than 98%. 
Table 5.3. Regression Analysis Output 
Regression Analysis 
The regression equation is 




G Spend -0.8452 
Stdev   t-ratio       p 
5.273      2.66   0.013 
0.04869      2.67   0.013 
0.2842     -2.97   0.006 
s = 3.587      R-sq = 32.4%    R-sq(adj) = 27.4% 
F       p 
6.46   0.005 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE      DF SS MS 
Regression   2      166.26      83.13 
Error       27     347.34       12.86 
Total       29     513.60 
SOURCE      DF     SEQ SS 
Liberali      1       52.48 
G Spend     1      113.78 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Liberali    Growth       Fit Stdev.Fit Residual   St.Resid 
1     41.0    -4.081      3.693 0.858    -7.774     -2.23R 
25     67.3     -3.676     4.988      1.130    -8.664     -2.55R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
Durbin-Watson statistic =1.96 
No evidence of lack of fit (P > 0.1) 
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It is also important to call attention to a possible problem of correlation that can 
happen between the relative size of government spending and the economic growth rate 
during periods of economic recession. This correlation could influence the result of the 
regression analysis toward a negative relationship between these variables. During a 
recession, both the GNP and the economic growth decrease. The government spending is 
likely to continue at the same level, if the recession period is short, or decrease slower 
than the GNP, if the recession period is extended. This causes an increase in the relative 
size of the government (spending/GNP). In such a situation, these variables move in 
opposite directions. It is clear, however, that the decrease in economic growth is not 
caused by the increase in the relative size of the government. It is caused by the factors 
that lead the country into a recession. 
To correct for this, two approaches were used. First, a regression was run using 
the same data from Table 5.2 except for those years with negative economic growth 
rates, so as to eliminate the periods of recession from the data. Second, a three-year 
moving average was used for the dependent variable "growth rate". This technique has 
the effect of smoothing the fluctuation on the variables caused by periods of recession. 
The results for the first approach are shown on Table 5.4. Notice that there is a 
significant decrease on some indicators. The level of confidence for the variable 
"government spending" drops to 91.8%. The R-sq adjusted falls by almost a half. Also, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic deteriorates. This test statistic is expected to be as close as 
possible to two, in absence of correlation between varialbes. However, the relationship 
found in the previous regression still holds. 
Table 5.5 shows the results for the second approach. Notice that now the 
relationship found in the first regression is made stronger. The t-ratio for all variables 
improved considerably. The p-value gives significance to these parameters at a level of 
more than 99%. The R-square adjusted almost doubled. Only the Durbin-Watson statistic 
dropped to a level that suggests the existence of some correlation among variables. 
Improvement on this analysis can be the subject of further study. 
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Table 5.4. Regression Analysis Output for Years 
without Recession 
Regression Analysis 
The regression equation is 
Growth = 9.67 + 0.0991 Liberali - 0.472 G. Spend 
Predictor Coef Stdev   t-ratio       p 
Constant 9.669 4.345      2.23   0.036 
Liberali 0.09909 0.04373      2.27   0.033 
G. Spend -0.4716     0.2595     -1.82   0.082 
s = 2.775      R-sq = 21.1%    R-sq(adj) = 14.2% 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE      DF SS MS        F       p 
Regression   2     47.228 23.614     3.07   0.066 
Error       23     177.076 7.699 
Total       25    224.304 
SOURCE      DF     SEQ SS 
Liberali     1     21.797 
G Spend     1     25.431 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.45 
No evidence of lack of fit (P > 0.1) 
7. Government Spending and Economic Growth 
Jisoon Lee (1990) conducted a study searching for any meaningful relationship 
between economic growth and government spending and reached at a conclusion similar 
to that of the regression above. He used an extension of the Solow's7 neoclassical growth 
model. He also ran a regression relating growth rate of the economy to the relative size of 
government spending, and the share of public investments in total government spending. 
7
 For more details about the Model see Lee (1990, p.263). 
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Table 5.5. Regression Analysis Output for Three Year Moving 
Average Growth Rate 
Regression Analysis 
The regression equation is 
Growth = 10.9 + 0.125 Liberali - 0.652 G. Spend 
Predictor Coef Stdev   t-ratio       p 
Constant 10.900      3.084      3.53    0.002 
Liberali 0.12533 0.02987      4.20   0.000 
G. Spend -0.6520 0.1620     -4.02   0.000 
s = 2.034      R-sq = 53.1%    R-sq(adj) = 49.4% 
Analysis of Variance 
SOURCE      DF         SS MS        F       p 
Regression   2     117.165 58.583     14.16   0.000 
Error       25     103.404 4.136 
Total       27    220.570 
SOURCE      DF     SEQ SS 
Liberali      1      50.159 
G. Spend     1      67.006 
Unusual Observations 
Obs. Liberali    Growth       Fit Stdev.Fit  Residual    St.Resid 
23      66.6     3.452     7.460      0.597    -4.007     -2.06R 
25     68.9     2.341     6.431      0.667    -4.090     -2.13R 
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid. 
Durbin-Watson statistic =1.00 
No evidence of lack of fit (P > 0.1) 
His conclusion was that the overall growth of the relative size of the government 
spending has been unfavorable to economic growth, (p. 289) Another significant finding 
of his study is about the effect that public investment has had in the economic growth and 
how productive it has been when compared with private spending. Using separate 
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variables for the private capital stock and the public capital stock, he found that each unit 
of private capital contributed about ten times as much to output as a unit of government- 
owned capital. In his conclusion he states8: 
...during the sample period the private capital has been about ten 
times as productive as the public capital. Therefore, even though there 
exists evidence that the public capital has been productive and has helped 
the economy to grow, it still appears to be the case that the accumulation 
of the private capital has been mainly responsible for the rapid economic 
growth.(p. 288) 
Lee also focused his study on the size of the government. He states that both the 
absolute and relative size of the government in South Korea have rapidly grown between 
1953 and 19869. However, the share of the government spending in GNP is still smaller 
than that for most of the other countries (Table 5.6). That is, despite its rapid growth, the 
government sector in Korea is still relatively small, (p. 276) 
Table 5.6. Relative Size of Government: World (in percent) 
(average of 1980-85): 
Total Defense Education Health Welfare 
Industrial countries 44.2 4.3 5.0 5.3 14.1 
U.S. 36.5 6.1 5.0 4.1 9.6 
W. Germany 48.7 2.8 4.2 8.1 21.7 
U.K. 45.0 5.2 5.4 4.6 14.2 
Singapore 26.5 5.5 5.6 1.7 1.8 
Japan 18.2 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Taiwan 23.0 5.5 3.7 0.5 0.8 
Argentina 36.1 1.8 3.4 1.4 8.7 
Chile 33.3 3.6 5.0 1.9 13.7 
Hungary 59.4 2.3 3.1 4.0 15.9 
Korea 24.8 5.4 4.2 0.6 3.5 
Source: From Lee (1990, p. 274) 
8
 The capital productivity calculation was based on the result of a nonlinear regression relating growth rates 
to investment shares, and relative size, applied to parameters of the Solow's model.(see Lee, 1990. p. 286) 
9
 The absolute size, which is a measure of the real government spending, has grown on an average of 9% in 
this period. The relative size, which is the share of government spending in GNP, has also grown from 
10.9% in 1953 to 20.2% in 1986. 
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This result is another expectation of the free market theory. With little 
government spending the Korean economy depended mainly on the private sector. This, 
according to the free market view, allowed the economy to grow at high rates. 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
This thesis focused on the controversy that divides economists regarding South 
Korean performance: if it has been good enough, if the government has been overly 
interventionist, and what has been responsible for the results, the government or the 
private market. This chapter focus on the findings of this research in relation to these 
points. First, the Korean performance will be analyzed. Then, in the same context, the 
other points of the controversy will be considered. 
The first conclusion about the Korean performance is that it has been outstanding. 
This is evident when its average GDP growth rate from 1964 to 1992 is compared to 
other countries. While South Korea grew at 8.84%, the developing countries grew at 
4.66% and industrialized countries grew at 3.26%. Also, the persistent increase in its 
participation in the international trade (exports and imports) shown in Figure 3.2 supports 
this argument. South Korea's exports, for example, grew at 23.1% per annum between 
1965 and 1986 (see Figure 5.1). 
The second point is that South Korea cannot maintain the current level of 
investment for a long period of time. As a consequence, it needs to improve the 
efficiency in the use of its resources in order to sustain economic growth. The consistent 
level of investment maintained by industrialized countries, in the range of between 20% 
and 25% (see Figure 3.3), strongly suggests that this is the feasible level in a period of 
sustained growth. The slight decreasing trend in the GDP growth rate shown in recent 
years (see Figure 3.1) can be the first sign that the Korean economy cannot support the 
same level of investment. The studies of Professors Alwyn Young and Laurence Lau (see 
Chapter III, C), conclude that the efficiency in the use of resources is not enough to 
sustain economic growth with a lower level of investment. 
Regarding the roles of the government and the private market, economists have 
placed themselves at either extreme of the controversy, giving credit either to the 
government or to the market for the economic growth, depending on the economists' 
point of view. I will argue that both the government and the market have their 
contributions. The government's and market's role, and the resulting contribution for 
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economic growth, have been different for various periods in the Korean economy. I will 
argue also that the government's contribution was not always beneficial suggesting that 
less government input would have lead to more impressive results. 
South Korea's recent economic history, in terms of the roles of the government 
and private market, can roughly be divided into three periods: First, the period 
comprising the post-Korean War, from 1953 until the military coup occurred in 1961; 
second, from 1962 until 1980, characterized by high growth; and third, from 1980 to the 
present, the liberalization period. 
In the first period, the government was highly interventionist and the results in 
terms of economic growth were poor. Priority was given to political considerations, not 
economic development. Import substitution was the strategy pursued by the government, 
with overvaluation of the exchange rate and high restrictions on imports. Figure 5.3 
shows how isolated the economy was from the international market. For a country 
densely populated and limited in natural resources, this isolation from the world market 
prevented the Korean economy from exercising its full potential. The private market was 
limited by the government's policies. It can be concluded that these policies were an 
obstacle to the full realization of the nation's economic potential. As a consequence, the 
growth rate of the GDP was low as shown in Figure 3.1. 
In the second period, there was an interplay between the government and private 
sector resulting in high economic growth. The government formulated the plans for the 
economy and the policies to influence the decision making process inducing the private 
sector to carry it out. The private market responded to the policies thereby taking 
advantage of the government's incentives. This environment cannot be considered a free 
market economy. However, the policies were built in such a way that the market was able 
to operate with consistent signs with consequent benefits for economic growth. 
Evidence about the government influence in the economic growth in this period 
comes from the policies used as instruments to influence the private market. Public 
enterprises were established in basic sectors with high degree of linkages and scale 
economies. The financial system was controlled by the government. A ceiling was put on 
interest rates. Loans at low rates of interest were ensured to entrepreneurs willing to take 
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on activities considered strategic by the government. Using these instruments, the 
government was able to influence the allocation of resources toward specific activities. 
The government had influence over what the economy was to produce. The heavy and 
chemical industry is the clearest example of how the structure of the economy was 
modified by government intervention. So, the government had participation in the 
economic growth as it occurred. 
The market's actions as factors able to influence economic growth cannot be seen 
as directly as the government's actions, but can be inferred from the resulting 
environment in which it worked. A favorable environment was present in the Korean 
economy in the 1960s and 1970s. It can be implied from the government priority on 
economic advancement, outward trade orientation, low price distortions, and significant 
steps taken toward liberalization in the mid-1960s. 
The government made economic advancement a top priority1. It had a positive 
impact on the economy, as the market perceived less risk for its investment. The level of 
investment depends on the entrepreneurs' expectations about the future. In developing 
countries the perceived government's intention is an important factor to be considered by 
investors. The outward trade orientation strategy allowed the economy to be integrated 
into the world market. This increased both exports and imports leading to economic 
growth. The extent to which the Korean economy became open can be seen by the rapid 
increase in imports and exports shown in Figure 3.2. The link between trade orientation 
and economic growth was shown by the World Bank's study presented in Chapter IV. 
This study found South Korea strongly outward oriented. 
Further evidence of the market's contribution to economic growth in response to 
the favorable environment is the low price distortion present in the Korean economy. 
This low price distortion was found by the World Bank's study presented in Chapter IV. 
Also, the correlation between price distortions and economic growth was captured in this 
study. A significant step toward liberalization was taken in the mid-1960s as shown in 
Although this event sounds like a government intervention, in fact it is not. This is the sound climate 
expected by entrepreneurs in a free market. This is also true when referring to the fact that the government 
adopted an outward trade orientation strategy, or maintained a properly valued exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.3. This means that the government decreased its degree of intervention in this 
period allowing the private market to exercise its actions with more degree of freedom. 
From 1980 on, as the economy became big and more complex, the liberalization 
process was accelerated, thus substantially increasing the private market's influence in 
economic growth. The government has been withdrawing from intervening in the market 
place. Market forces are now the main source of the economic growth. Yet, the 
government maintains its hand in the economy, mainly through special laws designed to 
protect selected sectors, such as telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and technology 
development. The main tools of Korean government intervention, however, including 
subsidies, preferential access to subsidized credit, extensive quantitative import 
restrictions, and high tariffs have been eliminated or reduced. 
Import liberalization, including reduction on tariffs and quantitative restrictions, 
is shown in Figure 5.3. This process made South Korea become, in 1986, the most open 
of the world's larger economies (see Figure 5.2). The abolition of the preferential lending 
rate system and the reduction of the scope of directed credit toward selected sectors of 
the economy, reduced significantly the distortion in financial costs and returns to capital 
among different sectors (see Figure 5.4 and 5.5). This is the most significant step toward 
a free market, since it allows private entrepreneurs to allocate the resources in the 
activities where the country has a comparative advantage. 
There is also substantial evidence that the economy was negatively affected by 
the government's intervention. Inefficiency in public enterprises, distortions in the 
allocation of credit that did not reflect the cost of money, limited growth in the export 
sector in the late 1970s due to preferential policies benefiting the heavy and chemical 
industry, and business concentration leading to a lack of competitiveness are some 
examples. This prompts a question: Would South Korea have done better with less 
government intervention? Besides the above, this research presented two main pieces of 
evidence for an affirmative answer to this question. First is the regression analysis 
performed in chapter V showing that the GDP growth rate is positively related to 
liberalization and negatively related to government spending. Second are the results of 
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Jisoon Lee's study pointing in the same direction, and further stating that the private 
capital has been about ten times as productive as public capital. 
The result of the regression model is very suggestive and, in my point of view, 
helps to solve the controversy. This economic growth, as it occurred, has contributions 
from both the government and private sector, as shown above. However, with the 
economy working as a free market with the resources in the hands of private 




This thesis was an attempt to access how good has been the Korean performance 
since the end of the Korean War and to decide what has been responsible for the 
economic growth, the government or the free market forces. To do so, the main facts 
about the Korean performance were presented and analyzed and the roles of the Korean 
government and of the free market in the economy were discussed. 
The Korean performance has been outstanding. Supporting this conclusion are its 
GDP growth rate, which is far superior to the average achieved by other developing and 
industrialized countries, and its remarkable increase in participation in the international 
market, measured by its volume of imports and imports. However, there is evidence of 
notably low efficiency in the use of resources by the Korean economy, threatening a 
future sustained growth. 
The government's and market's role, and the resulting contribution to the 
economic growth, have varied in different periods in the Korean economy. First was the 
period ranging from the end of the Korean War until the military coup of 1961, 
characterized by a highly interventionist government and a poor result in terms of 
economic growth. The import substitution strategy adopted in this period isolated the 
economy from the international market limiting it from exercising its full potential. 
Second, from the military coup until 1980, was an interplay between the government and 
private market, thus resulting in high growth. The government's policies in this period 
were able to influence the allocation of resources and the shape of the economy. The 
private sector took advantage of these government incentives, operating in an 
environment with favorable and persistent signs: the government priority on economic 
advancement, outward trade orientation, low price distortions, and significant steps 
toward liberalization as taken in the mid-1960s. The third period, from 1980 to the 
present, was characterized by liberalization of the economy. The main tools used by the 
government to intervene in the economy have been eliminated or reduced. 
Evidence that the economy was negatively affected by government intervention 
was found. A regression was run relating the GDP growth rate to the degree of trade 
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liberalization and the level of government spending. The result was that the GDP growth 
rate was positively related to trade liberalization and negatively related to government 
spending. 
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